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Abstract
Market reforms in developing and transition economies have some-
times failed to deliver the desired welfare eﬀects. Corruption may be
an important reason for the ineﬃciency of market reforms, such as
privatization campaigns. The present paper demonstrates how cor-
ruption can aﬀect the choice of buyer of a public asset. Our main
result is that market reform in highly corrupt societies is likely to re-
sult in less competition and less economic eﬃciency than reform in less
corrupt societies. We also demonstrate that the level of bribes in the
sale of public assets does not necessarily increase in the government’s
emphasis on bribes.
Keywords: Corruption, market reform, privatization
JEL codes: F23, L12
1 Introduction
Privatization and deregulation are important ingredients of market reform
programs in most developing and transition economies. These reforms are
expected to improve economic eﬃciency by reducing the role of the state and
increasing the degree of private sector competition in the economy.
∗We would like to thank Karl Ove Moene and Susan Rose-Ackerman for useful com-
ments. Communicating author: Tina Søreide, Chr.Michelsen Institute, P.O.Box 6033
Postterminalen, 5892 Bergen, Norway. e-mail: tina.soreide@cmi.no.
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Despite the many examples of significant market improvements (Kikeri
and Nellis, 2001), privatization and deregulation do not always deliver the
expected results. Manzetti (1999, page 328) argues that many cases of priva-
tization in South-America have resulted in more market concentration, not
less. Puntillo (1996) reports that the hasty process of privatization in Russia
in the 1990s often resulted in very limited improvements in productivity and
negligible state revenue.
Corruption may be one reason for failure of privatization and deregulation
to improve economic eﬃciency. In the words of Joseph Stiglitz (2002, page
58): “Perhaps the most serious concern with privatization, as it has so often
been practiced, is corruption. (...) In country after country, government
oﬃcials have realized that privatization meant that they no longer needed
to be limited to annual profit skimming. By selling a government enterprise
below market price, they could get a significant chunk of the asset value
for themselves rather than leaving it for subsequent oﬃceholders. In eﬀect,
they could steal today much of what would have been skimmed oﬀ by future
politicians. Not surprisingly, the rigged privatization process was designed to
maximize the amount government ministers could appropriate for themselves,
not the amount that would accrue to the government’s treasury, let alone the
overall eﬃciency of the economy.”
Accordingly, Manzetti and Blake (1996) argue that in the reforming Latin
American countries privatization of public assets has replaced the sale of pub-
lic contracts and jobs as the focal point of corruption. They refer to a number
of cases, one of them being the privatization of the Banco Occidental de De-
scuento in Venezuela (see pages 681-682). “This bank was privatized via the
sale of stock whose initial price was set by the Minister of the National In-
vestment Fund (FIV), Gerver Torres, at the undervalued price of 320 bolivars
(approximately $6) a share, despite widespread knowledge of many oﬀers to
purchase the initial public oﬀering at much higher prices.” A few weeks later,
a single investor sold shares representing 35 per cent of the public oﬀering at
2500 bolivars per share, cashing in a profit of $34.9 million in just over one
month on an investment of around $5.1 million.
Reports on corruption in the sale of public assets appear frequently in
other corners of the world as well. In Nigeria, for instance, the licensing of
prime oil exploration acreage were put under investigations after controver-
sial decisions to leave some prime blocks for separate discreet negotiation
(Africa Confidential, 4 August 2000). The supply side of this kind of corrup-
tion is described by one of the more famous European corruption scandals. A
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former senior oﬃcial of Elf-Aquitaine, France’s former state-owned oil com-
pany, admitted in court that Elf had paid bribes over the past 25 years to
top African politicians and oﬃcials to obtain lucrative contracts on diversion
of oil revenues. (Global Witness, July 12, 2000)1.
One reason why corruption may be a particularly severe problem in the
sale of public assets, is that it is typically very diﬃcult to place a value on
these assets. Hence, it is not easy for a third party to judge whether or not
the price announced after the sale of the asset is reasonable or not. In the
case of privatization, Rose-Ackerman (1999: 35) notes that: “Corrupt oﬃcials
may present information to the public that makes the company look weak
while revealing to favored insiders that it is actually doing well.” There may
be a gap between the actual price of the asset and the one announced to the
public, with the diﬀerence ending up in the pockets of corrupt bureaucrats
and politicians. This problem is a key concern in the present paper.
The link between corruption and the decision to privatize is discussed in
Shleifer (1998), Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Laﬀont and Meleu (1999), and
Coolidge and Rose-Ackerma (1997). In the present study, we take the sale
of the public asset as given, and analyse how a government’s preferences
for bribes may aﬀect the outcome of market reform. Market reform in the
present context means the sale of a public asset that allows the entry of
new producers in the market. Privatization is one example of the market
reform we have in mind, and we shall sometimes refer to the reform simply
as privatization. But our analysis is relevant also for other types of policies,
such as the issuing of new investment and production licenses or the re-
allocation of natural resources necessary for local production. Our model
shows that the sale of the public asset by a highly corrupt regime may result
in a highly concentrated industry structure and reduced economic eﬃciency.
Moreover, the analysis demonstrates how the eagerness of the government
to accept bribes aﬀects the level of bribes in the sale of the public asset.
Interestingly, the equilibrium size of the bribe may well fall as the propensity
of the government to accept bribes increases.
Our paper is related to Norbäck and Persson (2001). Their major concern
is the relation between privatization, foreign acquisition and entry modes.
However, while Norbäck and Persson assume that the company oﬀering the
highest bid always obtains the state assets, the present paper emphasizes the
1This scandal involves several French top politicians, and the case is again up for the
court, see The New York Times, April 18, 2003.
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importance of political consideration, more precisely, the trade-oﬀ between
private welfare and bribes, in the choice of acquiring firm.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model, the price,
and the impact of political preferences for the outcome of a privatization.
Section 3 applies the model to diﬀerent market structures. Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 The model
Consider a country S implementing a market reform. The reform includes
the privatization of a state-owned company, to be sold in one piece. We do
not discuss why the market reform is taking place. It could be part of a
reform program imposed on the country by the IMF as a condition for new
loans. It could be the result of domestic political pressure to reform the
economy as the result of, say, the electoral victory of a right-wing party. Or
it could be based on a need to cut public sector costs by selling out a badly
managed, loss making public enterprise.
There is more than one firm interested in acquiring the state owned-firm.
The potential buyers may diﬀer in various respects. In the present analysis
we focus on diﬀerences along two dimensions, trade costs and ownership. In
an extension to the model, we also discuss the issue of greenfield investment.
These diﬀerences determine the profits for the firms obtainable by the ac-
quisition, and hence their willingness to pay for the state-owned company.
Similarly, the consequences on the local economy may diﬀer, depending on
which firm ends up acquiring the state-owned firm.
We restrict our attention to the case of two potential buyers of the state
asset, firm 1 and firm 2. Firm 1 faces lower trade costs than firm 2 when
selling goods to buyers in country S. Accordingly, with ti representing per
unit transaction costs of firm i exporting to country S, we have 0 ≤ t1 < t2. In
the case of t1 = 0, firm 1 is located in market S, and when this is the case, we
consider both domestic and foreign ownership of this firm. When t1, t2 > 0,
both firms are located abroad, and we assume that they are both foreign
owned. In this case the state owned company is the only local producer prior
to reform. Acquiring the state asset allows the buying firm to sell in the
market without incurring any transaction costs.
Before showing their interest to the government by oﬀering a price, and
perhaps also a bribe, the two potential buyers analyze the market situation
4
that will occur in each possible outcome of the reform. The government of
country S and the two firms are fully informed about the relevant payoﬀs of
the game.
The firms sell an identical good q, the demand for which is given by
q = 1 − p, where p is the market price for the good. Given the outcome
that both firms operate in the market, there is Cournot competition between
them. Marginal production costs are identical between the two firms and
are normalized to zero. We assume that the acquiring firm can implement
its technology in the acquired firm at zero cost. In the case of local duopoly
prior to reform the local private firmmay end up as a monopolist by acquiring
the state-owned firm, given trade cost above a critical level. Under such a
circumstance the operating profits are
πm = 1
4
, (1)
where superscript m denotes monopoly. In duopoly, equilibrium operat-
ing profits for the acquiring firm i are given by
πdi =
(1 + tj)
2
9
, i 6= j. (2)
Operating profits for the non-acquiring, or “outside”, firm j, when ex-
porting to country S, are given by
πˆdj =
(1− 2tj)2
9
, (3)
where superscript d indicates duopoly. Consumer surplus under monopoly
is given by
σm = 1
8
, (4)
and in the duopoly case by:
σdi =
(2− tj)2
18
, i 6= j, (5)
when firm i is the acquiring firm and j the outside firm exporting to
country S. The government’s choice of buyer is based on two considerations.
On the one hand, it has to please the public in order to survive politically,
for instance in order to be re-elected. This is an argument in favour of
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maximizing private sector welfare, ω. On the other hand, government oﬃcials
try to obtain personal benefits, i.e. to collect bribes, b. What we call a bribe
may also represent other benefits to the politicians in charge, like payments to
political parties or promises of lucrative career opportunities in the acquiring
firm. Let the objective function of the government be given by:
U = (1− β)ω + βb, (6)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the weight that the government places on collecting
bribes relative to producing private welfare. We sometimes refer to β as the
government’s propensity to take bribes, and view it as a measure of govern-
ment corruption. In a society where corruption is a marginal phenomenon,
and/or where political competition is suﬃciently tough to make private wel-
fare the priority issue for the incumbent government, β can be expected to
be low. In case corruption is rampant and/or the political opposition to the
incumbent government is weak, β is likely to be high.
Private welfare is defined as consumer surplus, σ, plus the net profits of
locally owned firms, µl. The sum of these two surpluses can be seen as a
measure of economic eﬃciency in the economy. In addition, private sector
welfare includes transfers to the private sector from the sale of the public
asset, the size of these transfers being equal to the oﬃcial price of the sale
and denoted by λ. Private welfare when firm i acquires the state asset can
therefore be written as
ωi = σi + µl + λ. (7)
We distinguish between the oﬃcially announced acquisition price, λ, and
the true acquisition price, θ, that includes all kinds of payments from the
firm acquiring the state-owned enterprise. The diﬀerence between the two is
the size of the bribe, which for firm i is
bi = θi − λ. (8)
We abstract from other sources of corruption income, such as firms’ op-
erating profits. Note that if a local firm acquires the state-owned firm,
µl = πl − θl, whereas if a foreign firm acquires the asset, µl = πˆdl .
The public is assumed to have no information about the true price of the
transaction. However, the public may expect to see some income coming
from the sale of the state asset, so the oﬃcial price, λ, is likely to be positive.
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If the private sector had information about the firms’ willingness to pay for
the public asset, it could insist on receiving a share of the true price. If this
were the case, the size of λ would depend positively on the size of the true
price, θ. With a completely uninformed private sector, there is no reason
why there should be a relation between λ and θ.2
The sale of the public asset can be thought of as a two-stage process.
First, the government chooses which firm to enter into negotiations with,
based on a comparison of the two firm’s potential in generating utility for
the government. Second, the government and the chosen firm negotiate on
the price of the state asset, which implies agreeing on the size of the bribe.
We assume that the bribe is determined by a Nash bargaining solution.
At the first stage, the government determines which firm to negotiate
with. To determine the potential of the two firms’ in generating utility for
the government, we first consider the maximum bribe that each of the two
firms is willing to oﬀer. Note that there is a diﬀerence between a foreign
owned and a locally owned firm in this respect. The government wishes to
extract as high a bribe as possible from a foreign-owned firm. For a locally-
owned firm, the situation may be diﬀerent. The reason is that a bribe from a
locally owned firm is paid for by “local” money, which has its counterpart in
reduced profits for the local firm and hence reduced domestic private welfare.
For β < 1
2
, the government views a dollar in the form of local profits as more
worth than a dollar in the form of bribes. Hence, in this case the government
is not interested in asking for bribes from a locally owned company. For
β > 1
2
, however, the government places a higher weight on bribe income than
local profits, and therefore also wants to extract as high a bribe as possible
from the locally owned firm.
Consider first a sale to a foreign firm. The maximum payment that a
foreign firm i is willing to oﬀer in order to acquire the state owned firm is
given by
bmaxi = πi − πˆdi − λ, (9)
where πi is the operating profits that the firmwould get after acquiring the
state asset, and πˆdi is i’s operating profits as an outside firm, facing duopoly
competition from the privatized firm. As noted above, λ is the part of the
2Note that if λ were a function of θ, the oﬃcial price would be the equivalent of an
income tax on the government. While this would modify our results by making bribes
less attractive for a corrupt government, the basic mechanisms driving our model would
survive as long as the marginal tax on bribe income is less than 100 percent.
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acquisition price that is transferred to the private sector. Private welfare in
case of a foreign acquisition is given by
ωi = σi + πˆdl + λ, (10)
where πˆdl is profits of the locally owned firm when it is outside the acqui-
sition. Consider now selling to a locally owned firm. The maximum bribe
that a locally owned firm l is willing to oﬀer is given by
bmaxl
= 0 for β < 1
2
= πl − πˆdl − λ for β > 12
. (11)
Welfare derived from selling to a locally owned firm oﬀering its maximal
bribe can be expressed as3:
bmaxl ⇒ ωl
= σl + πl for β < 12
= σl + πˆdl + λ for β > 12
. (12)
Selling to a firm j = i, l that oﬀers its maximum bribe results in govern-
ment utility:
Umaxj = (1− β)ωj + βbmaxj . (13)
The government sells to firm i as long as Umaxi > U
max
j , i 6= j. Denote as
βˆ the critical level of β below which the government prefers to sell to j and
above which the preferred buyer is i. This critical β can be found by setting
Umaxi = U
max
j , which results in:
βˆ = ωj − ωiωj − ωi + bmaxi − bmaxj
. (14)
Clearly, if one firm delivers both higher private welfare and higher bribes
than its rival, this firm will be the preferred buyer of the state asset. The
interesting problem arises when one firm delivers higher private welfare and
the other higher bribes. In this case the government faces a trade-oﬀ. The
outcome of this trade-oﬀ is determined by the degree to which the two firms
diﬀer in their respective “strengths”, i.e. in delivering private welfare or
3bmaxl ⇒ ωl = σi + πl − (bmaxl + λ) + λ
β < 0⇒ bmaxl = 0⇒ ωl = σl + πl − (0 + λ) + λ = σl + πl
β > 0⇒ bmaxl = πl − πˆ
d
l − λ⇒ ωl = σl + πl −
³³
πl − πˆdl − λ
´
+ λ
´
+ λ = σl + πˆdl + λ
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bribes, and in the weight the government places on these arguments in its
objective function.
Based on (14) the government determines which firm to negotiate with.
At the second stage of the government’s decision process, it must negotiate
the acquisition price, and therefore the bribe, with the chosen firm. Let the
equilibrium bribe be defined by the Nash bargaining solution. We already
know the firms’ reservation bribes, as given by (9) and (11). Define the
minimum bribe that the government would be willing to accept from firm
i as bmini . This is the bribe that firm i has to oﬀer in order to match what
the government could get by negotiating with the other firm. The minimum
bribe that firm i must oﬀer to win the auction is given by4:
bmini =
(1− β)
β (ωj − ωi) + b
max
j , i 6= j. (15)
Accordingly, there is only room for negotiation between the government
and firm i as long as bmaxi ≥ bmini . The equilibrium bribe is given by:
b∗i = γbmaxi + (1− γ) bmini , for bmaxi ≥ bmini , (16)
where γ represents the bargaining strength of the government relative to
that of the acquiring firm.
3 Analysis
The description of the model so far shows that the choice of buyer for the
public asset, as well as the level of bribes, is determined by ownership, trade
costs, and the government’s propensity to take bribes. In what now follows
we analyze the outcome of the market reform as a function of the eagerness
of the government in accepting bribes, under diﬀerent assumptions of trade
costs and ownership structure. Cases 1 and 2 consider the privatization of
a state-owned firm producing a non-traded good. In the first case, the two
firms are a locally owned private firm and a foreign firm, “foreign” both
4From (6) we know that Ui = (1 − β)ωi + βbi, which can be expressed as bi =
1
β (Ui − (1− β)ωi). For firm i to win the tender, it has to match the maximum utility
derived from selling the asset to its rival, j, defined as Umaxj = (1− β)ωj + βbmaxj . With
Umaxj = Ui, we get (15).
9
in terms of ownership and initial location. We can think of this case as
the privatization of a state-owned bank, where in the pre-reform market a
locally owned private bank is also present in the market. A foreign bank is
interested in entering the market through the acquisition of the state-owned
bank. In the second case, the local competitor to the state-owned firm is
foreign owned. In the bank example, this means that a foreign owned bank
is already established in country S and that a second foreign bank without
a presence in that market considers entering through the acquisition of the
state-owned bank.
Cases 3 and 4 consider privatization in a market for tradeables. In terms
of ownership structure, Case 3 is identical to Case 1. A locally owned private
firm and a foreign based, foreign-owned firm compete for the state-owned
firm. As an example, we can think of the privatization of a state-owned car
producer. Prior to the reform, a locally owned, private car producer operated
side by side with the state owned firm, possibly also facing competition from
a foreign car producer exporting to country S. With the privatization of
the state-owned production unit, the foreign car producer has the option of
entering the market through a cross-border acquisition in addition to exports.
Case 4 is identical to Case 2 in terms of ownership structure. But now one of
the foreign firms, or both of them, are located outside country S prior to the
reform, and face the choice of entry through acquisition or exports. We can
think of it as the privatization of a state-owned car producer that prior to
reform either operated as a monopolist or faced competition from imported
cars. In the monopoly case, the reform would entail both the privatization
of the state-owned firm and the opening up for imports. The four cases are
summarized in Table 1 below
Table 1. The cases
Local vs. foreign firm Foreign firms only
Non-traded goods Case 1 Case 2
Traded goods Case 3 Case 4
In an extension to the model, we discuss the implications of allowing for
greenfield investment in addition to exports and acquisition as an entry mode
into country S.
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3.1 Case 1
Consider the case where firm 1 is a domestically owned firm. Firm 2 is foreign
owned. Trade costs are such that the foreign firm cannot profitably export
to country S, i.e. t2 > 12 . If firm 1 acquires the asset it gets a monopoly
position in the market. If firm 2 acquires the asset, the two firms enter into
duopoly competition.
bmax1
= 0 for β < 1
2
= πm − πˆd1 − λ = 14 −
1
9
− λ for β > 1
2
. (17)
bmax2 = πd2 − λ =
1
9
− λ (18)
and
bmax1 ⇒ ω1
= σm + πm = 1
8
+ 1
4
for β < 1
2
= σm + πˆd1 + λ = 18 +
1
9
+ λ for β > 1
2
, (19)
and when selling to the foreign firm as:
ω2 = σd2 + πˆd1 + λ =
4
18
+
1
9
+ λ. (20)
Using equations (17) to (20) in (14), we can find the critical levels of β
for which the government is indiﬀerent between selling to firm 1 or 2. There
are two such critical levels of β. One for β < 1
2
, which we shall call βˆa, and
one for β > 1
2
, which we shall call βˆb. It is straightforward to show that
βˆa = 72λ−3144λ−11
βˆb = 79
. (21)
Using (17) to (20) in (15), we can find bmini . Figure 1 illustrates the
minimum and maximum bribe levels as functions of β, as well as the critical
levels of β, for a given value of λ. The shaded areas illustrate the negotiation
room, i.e. the distance between reservation bribe of the acquiring firm and
the government.
For β < βˆa, the government sells the asset to firm 1, taking no bribe.
For βˆa < β < βˆb, the asset is sold to firm 2. For β > βˆb, firm 1 buys the
asset and pays a bribe. An increase in λ shifts bmin1 and bmin2 downwards
and reduces βˆa while leaving βˆb unchanged. From (21) we find that λ ≥ 124
11
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Figure 1: Case 1
implies βˆa ≤ 0. Hence, if the oﬃcial acquisition price exceeds this level, the
government prefers to sell to the foreign firm for all values of β < βˆb.
To understand Figure 1, let us go through the costs and benefits of selling
to the local firm versus the foreign firm. There are two advantages of selling
to the foreign firm. First, to the benefit of consumers foreign entry will lead
to duopoly competition. Second, a foreign acquisition means that the state
asset is paid for by foreign money. Contrast this to bribes paid by the local
firm, which would reduce local profits and hence private welfare. Similarly,
there are two benefits of selling to the local firm. First, by avoiding entry
of the foreign firm, the local firm gains. Second, since the local firm gains
a monopoly position by acquiring the state asset, whereas the foreign firm
only gains a duopoly position, the willingness to bribe is higher for the local
firm. Note, however, that this only applies for β > 1
2
. For β < 1
2
, the optimal
bribe paid by the local firm is zero.
For β < βˆa, the government prefers to sell the asset to the locally owned
firm, firm 1. The reason is that the alternative, namely selling to the foreign
firm, would lead to profit shifting in favor of the foreign company. For λ < 1
24
,
the profit shifting eﬀect dominates the gain in consumer surplus plus the
oﬃcial transfer of income from selling the asset to the foreign firm. Hence,
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private welfare is an argument in favor of selling to the local firm. And for
low levels of β, private welfare is indeed the government’s main concern.
An increase in β means a larger weight being placed on bribes. Firm 2
has the advantage of bringing in foreign money, and wins the bidding contest
for βˆa < β < βˆb. As β approaches unity, the government cares mostly about
the size of the bribe and is not so concerned with the source of the bribe, i.e.
whether it is paid for by foreign money or local money. Hence, for β > βˆb,
firm 1, which is the higher bidder, wins the contest.
The equilibrium bribe depends on the negotiation strength of the govern-
ment relative to that of the firm, γ, as described in (16). Figure 2 shows the
equilibrium bribe level, denoted by b∗, as a function of β for γ = 1
2
.
0 0.5 1
β
b*
 β ^ b β ^ a
Figure 2: Equilibrium bribe: Case 1
Clearly, the relation between the eagerness of the government to accept
bribes and the equilibrium level of bribes is fairly complex. For β < βˆa the
equilibrium bribe is zero since private sector profits carry a larger weight
than bribe income in the government’s utility function. At β = βˆa there is a
discrete jump in the bribe level, as the government enters into negotiations
with the foreign firm rather than the local firm. The bribe compensates for
the business stealing eﬀect from the locally owned firm to the foreign firm
resulting from a foreign acquisition.
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An increase in β in the interval βˆa < β < 12 leads to a reduction in the
equilibrium bribe level. As we can see from Figure 1, the reason is that bmin2
goes down. And the reason that bmin2 goes down is that the more weight
that the government places on bribe income, the less firm 2 needs to bribe in
order to win the contract. For 1
2
< β < βˆb the equilibrium bribe rises with
β. Technically, the reason is that bmin2 increases together with the fact that
there is a discrete jump in bmax1 at β = 12 , resulting in bmax1 > bmax2 . Intuitively,
now that the government cares more about bribes it is less concerned about
local private welfare. This is an advantage for firm 1, which has the higher
willingness to bribe. Firm 2 still wins the contract, but has to pay a higher
bribe in order to win the contract as β goes up.
At βˆb the government is indiﬀerent between selling to firm 1 and firm
2. At this point there is a discrete jump in the bribe. In order to win
the contract, firm 1 has to compensate for the fact that it does not bring
in foreign money, and the compensation takes the form of paying a higher
bribe. An increase in β for β > βˆb reduces the acquisition price. Intuitively,
as β increases, the government becomes increasingly focused on the size of
the bribe, and less concerned with who pays for it. The advantage of the
foreign firm, namely that it pays with foreign money, is therefore reduced.
Hence, the bribe that firm 1 must pay in order to win the contest is also
reduced.
It may be interesting to consider the impact of corruption on private
welfare in the present case. The eﬀects of political preferences on private
welfare and state revenues can be summarized as:
ω =
σm + πm = 1
8
+ 1
4
for β < βˆa
σd2 + πˆd1 + λ = 418 +
1
9
+ λ for βˆa < β < βˆb
σm + πˆd1 + λ = 18 +
1
9
+ λ for β > βˆb
. (22)
As discussed earlier, βˆa > 0 requires λ < 124 . Hence, comparing private
welfare for β < βˆa with βˆa < β < βˆb, we can conclude that as long as
βˆa > 0 applies, private welfare is higher in the former case than in the latter.
Comparing the situation where βˆa < β < βˆb with that of β > βˆb, it is clear
that private welfare is higher in the former case. Hence, increased corruption
leads to a reduction in private welfare in the present scenario.
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3.2 Case 2
We now turn to the case where both firms are foreign owned. The assump-
tions regarding trade costs are exactly as in Case 1. Following the same
procedure as in the previous case, the maximum bribe levels and levels of
private welfare can be described as follows:
bmax1 = πm − πˆd1 − λ =
1
4
− 1
9
− λ, (23)
bmax2 = πd2 − πˆd2 − λ =
1
9
− 0− λ, (24)
ω1 = σm + λ =
1
8
+ λ. (25)
ω2 = σd2 + λ =
4
18
+ λ. (26)
Using equations (23) to (26) in (14), we can find the critical level of β,
below which the government chooses to negotiate with firm 2 and above
which it chooses firm 1, as:
βˆ = 7
9
(27)
As in Case 1, we can find bmini by using equations (23) to (26) in (15).
Figure 3 illustrates Case 2, for a given level of λ. An increase in λ leads to
a downward shift in bmin1 and b
min
2 , while leaving βˆ unchanged.
Case 2 is less complex than Case 1. The choice of buyer aﬀects private
welfare only through its eﬀect on consumer surplus. Moreover, the distinction
between local and foreign money does not apply. The advantage of firm 2
is that it provides competition and therefore higher consumer surplus and
private welfare. The advantage of firm 1 is that it has a higher willingness
to pay bribes. A government largely concerned with private welfare would
choose to sell to firm 2, whereas a highly corrupt government would sell to
firm 1. In Figure 2, the critical level of corruption is given by βˆ.
There will be a discrete jump in the bribe level at βˆ. To acquire the
state asset, firm 1 must compensate for the loss in consumer surplus from
changing from duopoly to monopoly. An increase in β for β > βˆ lowers the
bribe in equilibrium for γ < 1, i.e. as long as the acquiring firm has some
bargaining power. The less the government cares about private welfare, the
less bribes firm 1 needs to pay to win over firm 2 in the acquisition game.
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Figure 3: Case 2
For β < βˆ, the bribe level is likely to increase with the level of β. The less
the government cares about private welfare, the higher is the bribe that firm
2 needs to pay in order to win the bidding contest. Note that for suﬃciently
low levels of β there may be no bribe at all if the negotiation power of firm
2 is suﬃciently strong. Indeed, the government may oﬀer a subsidy to firm
2 to induce it to acquire the public asset. In this case, too, corruption has a
clearly negative eﬀect on private welfare:
ω = σ
m + λ = 1
8
+ λ for β < βˆ
σd2 + λ = 418 + λ for β > βˆ
. (28)
Acquisition by the foreign based firm leads to higher consumer surplus
and therefore higher private welfare. An increase in β such that we cross βˆ,
leads to a change from foreign acquisition to local acquisition, and hence a
reduction in private welfare.
3.3 Case 3
Consider now the possibility of profitable exports of firm 2, i.e. t2 ≤ 12 .
We start with the case where firm 1 is locally owned. Maximum bribes and
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welfare can be found as:
bmax1
= 0 for β < 1
2
= πd1 − πˆd1 − λ =
(1+t2)
2
9
− 1
9
− λ for β > 1
2
. (29)
bmax2 = πd2 − πˆd2 − λ =
1
9
− (1− 2t2)
2
9
− λ (30)
Note that bmax1 for β > 12 equals bmax2 for t2 =
2
5
. This means that for
2
5
< t2 <
1
2
, firm 1 has the larger willingness to bribe, given β > 1
2
. For
t2 <
2
5
, firm 2 has the larger willingness to bribe.
bmax1 ⇒ ω1
= σd1 + πd1 =
(2−t2)2
18
+ (1+t2)
2
9
for β < 1
2
= σd1 + πˆd1 + λ =
(2−t2)2
18
+ 1
9
+ λ for β > 1
2
, (31)
ω2 = σd2 + πˆd1 + λ =
4
18
+
1
9
+ λ. (32)
As in Case 1 we can find the critical levels of β for which the government
is indiﬀerent between selling to one firm or the other by using equations (29)
to (32) in (14). These are:
βˆa =
18λ−3t22
36λ−8t2+5t22
βˆb = 4−t29t2
, (33)
which are identical to the critical values defined by (21) for t2 = 12 , i.e.
where exports yields zero profits. A reduction in t2 reduces βˆa and increases
βˆb, thereby increasing the interval of β’s for which the government prefers to
sell to firm 2. Intuitively, the possibility of firm 2 entering country S with
exports lowers firm 1’s willingness to bribe, since monopoly is no longer a
possible outcome. Hence, bmax1 goes down for β > 12 . Moreover, for β <
1
2
the profit shifting argument in favor of selling to the local firm is weakened
as t2 goes down, since lower t2 increases the market share captured by the
foreign exporter.
From (33) we see that βˆb reaches unity for t2 = 25 . For trade costs below
this level, a government characterized by β > 1
2
would never sell to the local
firm. We can also find that βˆa reaches zero for t2 =
√
6
√
λ. For trade costs
below this level, a government characterized by β < 1
2
would never sell to
the local firm. Hence, a combination of high t2 and either very high or very
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low β is necessary for firm 1 to succeed in acquiring the state asset. For t2
below a critical level, firm 2 will be the acquiring firm irrespective of β.
How does the degree of corruption aﬀect private welfare in this case? The
eﬀects can be summarized as:
ω =
σd1 + πd1 =
(2−t2)2
18
+ (1+t2)
2
9
for β < βˆa
σd2 + πˆd1 + λ = 418 +
1
9
+ λ for βˆa < β < βˆb
σd1 + πˆd1 + λ =
(2−t2)2
18
+ 1
9
+ λ for β > βˆb
. (34)
Given that βˆa > 0 applies, we know that t2 >
√
6
√
λ. And in this case,
we know that private welfare is higher for β < βˆa than for βˆa < β < βˆb.
Moreover, private welfare is clearly higher for β > βˆb than for βˆa < β < βˆb
given t2 > 0. Hence, private welfare drops with the degree of corruption in
the government.
3.4 Case 4
Case 4 analyses the situation where both firms are foreign owned. We allow
t1 ≥ 0, but stick to our assumption that t2 > t1. Maximum bribes and
private welfare can be expressed as:
bmax1 = πd1 − πˆd1 − λ =
(1 + t2)
2
9
− (1− 2t1)
2
9
− λ, (35)
bmax2 = πd2 − πˆd2 − λ =
(1 + t1)
2
9
− (1− 2t2)
2
9
− λ, (36)
Note that bmax1 = b
max
2 for t2 =
2
5
− t1. For t2 higher than this level, firm 1
has the higher willingness to bribe, whereas for t2 lower than this level, firm
2 has the higher willingness to bribe.
ω1 = σd1 + λ =
(2− t2)2
18
+ λ. (37)
ω2 = σd2 + λ =
(2− t1)2
18
+ λ. (38)
Using the same procedure as in the previous cases, we can find:
βˆ = 4− (t1 + t2)
9 (t1 + t2)
(39)
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Note that for t1 = 0, the critical value of β defined in (39) becomes
identical to βˆb in Case 3. And with t1 = 0, t2 = 12 , then βˆ =
7
9
, as in Case
2. From (39) we see that for t2 = 25 − t1, βˆ = 1. Hence, even a government
completely focused on corruption would choose to sell to firm 2 for t2 < 25−t1.
For t2 > 25 − t1, however, a suﬃciently corrupt government would prefer to
sell to firm 1. We know from the discussion above that for t2 > 25 − t1, firm
1 has a higher willingness to bribe than firm 2. For a suﬃciently high β, the
bribe argument may induce the government to sell to firm 1, although selling
to firm 2 would generate higher private welfare. Private welfare is given by:
ω = σ
d
1 + λ =
(2−t2)2
18
+ λ for β < βˆ
σd2 + λ =
(2−t1)2
18
+ λ for β > βˆ
. (40)
Since t2 > t1, an acquisition by firm 2 leads to higher consumer surplus
and therefore higher private welfare. Hence, corruption leads to lower private
welfare also in this case.
3.5 Extension: Greenfield investment
The analysis has focussed on acquisition and trade as entry modes for a
foreign firm. How would allowing for greenfield investment aﬀect the model?
Consider first the competition between a firm located in market S and a
foreign based firm, as in Cases 1, 2, and 3. When greenfield investment is
the most profitable alternative to acquisition as entry mode for the foreign
firm, clearly the local firm has no incentive to bid for the state asset: The
outcome would in any case be duopoly competition with a foreign aﬃliate
located in market S. Since local consumers are also indiﬀerent with respect
to the choice of buyer, the outcome is necessarily one in which the foreign
firm acquires the assets for sale.
The more interesting situation is the one in which neither of the two firms
is present in country S prior to the reform, which is the market structure
analysed in Case 4. Assume that the best outside option for the firm facing
higher trade costs (firm 2) is to enter through a greenfield investment. Firm 1,
on the other hand, chooses exports as its best alternative to acquisition. With
F denoting greenfield investment costs, maximum bribes can be expressed
as:
bmax1 = πd1 − πˆd1 − λ =
1
9
− (1− 2t1)
2
9
− λ, (41)
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bmax2 = πd2 −
¡
πˆd2 − F
¢
− λ = (1 + t1)
2
9
−
µ
1
9
− F
¶
− λ, (42)
Note that bmax1 = b
max
2 for F =
1
9
t1 (2− 5t1) ≡ F ∗. For F < F ∗, firm 1
has the higher willingness to bribe, whereas firm 2 oﬀers the higher bribe for
F > F ∗. Intuitively, when greenfield costs are low, firm 2 prefers greenfield
investment to acquisition as mode of entry. Private welfare is given by:
ω1 = σd1 + λ =
4
18
+ λ. (43)
ω2 = σd2 + λ =
(2− t1)2
18
+ λ. (44)
Note that country S consumers are better oﬀ if the state assets are sold
to firm 1, which would trigger greenfield investment by firm 2, and hence
a duopoly between two producers located in the country. The alternative,
selling to firm 2, is less attractive for consumers, since after the privatization,
one of the producers, firm 1, would be located outside country S. This would
involve trade costs, and the market price would therefore be higher than if
the assets were sold to firm 1.
Since ω1 ≥ ω2 in the present case, we know that firm 2 has a chance of
winning the tender only if it oﬀers the higher bribe. And this is true only for
F > F ∗. Hence, for F < F ∗ we know that firm 1 will be the preferred buyer
irrespective of the corruption level in the government: It oﬀers both higher
private welfare and more bribes. For F > F ∗, however, a suﬃciently corrupt
government would prefer to sell to firm 2. More generally, we can find the
critical level of β below which firm 1 buys the state asset and above which
firm 2 wins the tender as:
βˆ = t1 (4− t1)
9 (t21 + 2F )
(45)
Clearly, corruption may harm private welfare in the present case by in-
ducing the government to sell to firm 2 rather than to firm 1.
4 Concluding remarks
Market reform in itself is no guarantee of improved economic eﬃciency. The
success depends on the resulting industrial structure in each specific market.
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In the sale of public assets we have seen that the resulting allocation of market
power is subject to the politicians’ choice of buyer. Corruption may aﬀect this
choice and therefore reduce economic welfare. Politicians primarily concerned
with attracting bribes are inclined to sell the asset to the firm oﬀering the
highest bribe. This firm is not necessarily the one oﬀering the highest surplus
for the consumers in the economy, but rather the one acquiring the greater
market power.
In addition to analyzing the choice of buyer, our study shows how the
propensity to accept bribes aﬀects the size of the bribe in equilibrium. Inter-
estingly, by weakening the government’s bargaining position in the privati-
zation process, an increase in the weight that a government places on bribes
may result in lower bribes in equilibrium.
We have restricted the analysis to a situation with only two firms inter-
ested in buying the state asset. Extending the model to include several firms
would, however, not change the results qualitatively. Basically, more firms
means tougher post-reform competition. Hence, firms’ willingness to pay,
and bribe, for the state asset goes down.
In the present paper, we have focussed on the choice of buyer of the pri-
vatized firm as the government’s only choice. However, our study suggests
that the opportunity to gain bribes may have an impact on the government’s
choice of trade and investment policy. Governments concerned about bribes
may try to keep entry barriers high in order to increase post-reform profits
and hence the willingness of firms to bribe. This is consistent with the results
of Ades and Di Tella (1999) who have carried out an empirical study of the
relation between the industrial organization of the briber’s market and the
extent of corruption. They conclude: “...corruption is higher in countries
where domestic firms are sheltered from foreign competition by natural or
policy induced barriers to trade, with economies dominated by a few number
of firms, or where antitrust regulation is not eﬀective in preventing anticom-
petitive practices. The size of the eﬀect is rather large...” The possibility of
trade and investment policy being used strategically by corrupt governments
to elicit bribes is a natural extension of the present model and is left for
future research.
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Summary 
Market reforms in developing and transition economies 
have sometimes failed to deliver the desired welfare effects. 
Corruption may be an important reason for the 
inefficiency of market reforms, such as privatization 
campaigns. The present paper demonstrates how 
corruption can affect the choice of buyer of a public asset. 
Our main result is that market reform in highly corrupt 
societies is likely to result in less competition and less 
economic efficiency than reform in less corrupt societies. 
We also demonstrate that the level of bribes in the sale of 
public assets does not necessarily increase in the 
government’s emphasis on bribes. 
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